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REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTIONS IN VICARIOUS
DISQUALIFICATION CASES: CAN THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY BE REBUTTED?-
NOVO TERAPEUTISK LABORATORIUM A/S
V. BAXTER TRAVENOL LABORATORIES, INC.
An attorney may be disqualified1 from representing a former client's 2
opponent in litigation 3 because he or she may have knowledge of confi-
dences potentially detrimental to the former client. Recently, litigants have
moved to disqualify not only their own former attorneys, but also their at-
torney's former colleagues. Even though these former colleagues did not
personally represent the movant, they may have acquired knowledge of the
movant's confidences through their prior association with the movant's attor-
ney. Accordingly, vicarious disqualification motions' are based on conten-
1. Disqualification is granted when the attorney's representation violates the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (as amended Aug. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as CODE]. The Code embodies the legal profession's own concept of the ethi-
cal obligations of attorneys and contains nine Canons supplemented by Ethical Considerations
and Disciplinary Rules. The Canons are "statements of axiomatic norms" while the Ethical Con-
siderations (EC) represent ultimate goals. Id. at Preamble. Disciplinary Rules (DR) describe
mandatory minimum standards of conduct. Id.
Canon 4, under which a disqualification motion may be brought, establishes the broad rule
that "a lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." Id. at Canon 4. Disci-
plinary Rules accompanying this Canon state that "a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal ...[or]
use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client." Id. at DR 4-101(B)(1)
& (2). Further, an Ethical Consideration advises that "no employment should be accepted that
might require such disclosure." Id. at EC 4-5.
The Code is binding if it has been incorporated in the rules of the court. See, e.g., N.D. ILL.
GEN R. 8 (a), (d). Those courts that have not specifically adopted the Code generally rely on
it for guidance in resolving questions of ethics. See, e.g., Central Milk Producers Coop. v.
Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 1978); Woods v. Covington County Bank,
537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
A court may order disqualification absent a violation of the Code. See, e.g., Handelman v.
Weiss, 368 F. Supp. at 263 ("questionable behavior will not be permitted merely because it is
not directly covered by the Canons"). Conversely, a court may refuse to disqualify an attorney
even though a violation has occurred. See, e.g., Central Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food
Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d at 991 (although the Code establishes proper guidelines, a violation does
not automatically result in disqualification).
2. A former client can assert a violation of Canon 4 because an attorney's ethical obligation
to preserve the confidences and secrets of his or her clients continues after the termination of
the attorney-client relationship. CODE, supra note 1, at EC 4-6. Accord, American Roller Co.
v. Budinger, 513 F.2d 982, 984 (3d Cir. 1975); American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d
1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp.
265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
3. Although an attorney's withdrawal may be sought in nonlitigation settings as well as in
criminal and civil litigation, the scope of this Note is limited to a discussion of disqualification
motions brought in civil litigation.
4. Since the attorney's withdrawal is sought not because of his or her prior attorney-client
relationship with the movant but because of an attorney-client relationship entered into by a
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tions that an attorney's representation of a party adverse to a former col-
league's 5 client creates an appearance of professional impropriety in violation
of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 6 Unfortunately,
courts have not been consistent in their interpretations of Canon 9.7 This
lack of uniformity prompted one commentator to compare vicarious dis-
qualification motions to "a game of ethical Russian Roulette.",
In Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories,
Inc.,9 the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered
the ethical obligations imposed by Canon 9 in reaching its decision on a
vicarious disqualification motion. The court held that if an attorney rebuts a
presumption that he or she shared the confidences of a former associate's
client, then the attorney's representation of that client's adversary does not
create an appearance of impropriety. 10 The Seventh Circuit's creation of a
rebuttable presumption of shared confidences and its refusal to order dis-
qualification even though an appearance of impropriety may have existed to
a layman may diminish both the public's confidence in the integrity of the
judicial system and the effectiveness of legal representation."
Following a review of prior approaches to vicarious disqualification mo-
tions, this Note analyzes the reasoning of the Novo opinion. It criticizes the
Seventh Circuit's failure to follow its own interpretation of Canon 9 and
suggests Novo's possible detrimental effect on the quality of legal representa-
tion. Finally, the Note concludes with a proposal for uniform guidelines in
vicarious disqualification cases.
former associate, the attorney's disqualification is vicarious. For a discussion of the policy con-
siderations underlying both traditional disqualification (i.e., in which the attorney whose with-
drawal is sought personally represented the movant) and vicarious disqualification, see generally
Liebman, The Changing Law of Disqualification: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw.
U.L. REV. 996 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Liebman].
5. A vicarious disqualification motion can also be directed at a current associate. Since this
situation is specifically addressed in the Code, it has not created significant problems for courts.
See CODE, supra note 1, at DR 5-105(D) (the inability of one member of a firm to represent a
client extends to all members of the firm). This Note will discuss only the more controversial
issue presented when the disqualification motion is directed at an attorney formerly associated
with the movant's attorney.
6. CODE, supra note 1, at Canon 9. Canon 9 states: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the
Appearance of Professional Impropriety." Id.
7. See text accompanying notes 26-35 infra.
8. O'Toole, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility: An Elusive Ethical
Guideline, 62 MARQ. L. REV. 313, 316 (1979) [hereinafter cited as O'Toole]. Courts have also
recognized the difficulty attorneys encounter in an effort to ensure that their conduct conforms
to ethical standards. See Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("in deciding questions of professional ethics men of goodwill often differ in their
conclusions").
9. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979).
10. Id. at 197.
11. See text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
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PRIOR APPROACHES TO VICARIOUS
DISQUALIFICATION MOTIONS
A vicarious disqualification motion is based on one attorney's prior
partnership or association with another attorney who previously represented
the movant. 1 2 Accordingly, such motions require a two level inquiry. First,
a court determines whether, hypothetically, the attorney who previously
represented the movant would be disqualified if he or she represented the
movant's opponent. 13 Second, a court considers whether this hypothetical
disqualification should be extended under Canon 9 to the attorney's former
colleague. 14
At the first level of inquiry, the proponent of a vicarious disqualification
motion must prove that: (1) a previous attorney-client relationship existed;
(2) the subject matter of the pending litigation and the prior representation
are substantially related; and (3) confidences potentially detrimental to the
proponent were reposed in the attorney. 15 The first element of proof has
elicited little comment because the existence of a prior attorney-client
relationship is usually uncontested. 16 The second and third elements are
interrelated. The substantial relationship requirement is met when the nexus
between the pending litigation and the prior representation enables a court
reasonably to conclude that the attorney might have acquired information
from the proponent that is relevant to the subject matter of the current
litigation. 17 Once a substantial relationship is established, courts irrebutta-
12. See note 4 supra.
13. See notes 15-20 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 21-35 and accompanying text infra.
15. These three elements of proof can be garnered implicitly from the courts' opinions, and
are stated explicitly by some courts. See General Elec. Co. v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68,
74 (E.D. Mich. 1977); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,
207 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
See also Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to that of
Former Client, 55 B.U. L. REV. 61, 66 (1975); Note, Disqualification of Counsel for the Ap-
pearance of Impropriety, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. 343, 349-50 nn.27-28 (1976).
16. An attorney-client relationship does not depend on the payment of fees or the execution
of a formal contract but can be implied from the conduct of the parties. See Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1316-19 (7th Cir. 1978) (rejecting the notion that
an attorney-client relationship is one of agency dependent upon express or implied consent and
including an excellent general discussion of when an attorney-client relationship arises); E.F.
Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 388 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (court implied an attorney-
client relationship when an attorney representing the movant's employer accompanied the mov-
ant when he testified at hearings investigating his employer's affairs).
17. See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). While the T.C. Theatre test has been widely accepted, some courts have
adopted a more rigorous standard, requiring a "patently clear" relationship between the current
litigation and the previous representation. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569
F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978).
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bly presume that the proponent reposed potentially detrimental confi-
dences 18 in the attorney.19
After the movant successfully proves each of the three elements required
at the first level, 20 a court often initiates the second level of inquiry by
18. "Confidences" are defined as "information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law." CODE, supra note 1, at DR 4-101(A). An attorney is also precluded from
disclosing a client's .'secrets." Id. at 1DR 4-101(B). "Secrets" are defined as "other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client."
id. at DR 4-101(A). As used throughout this Note, "confidences" will be considered to include
"secrets. "
19. See T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). Noting that the rule of secrecy was created, in part, "to encourage clients fully and freely
to make known to their attorneys all facts pertinent to their cause," the T.C. Theatre court
reasoned that this goal would be undermined if a client were required to prove that confidences
had been reposed in an attorney by revealing those confidences to a court. Id. at 269.
Since an attorney may participate in a legal representation without directly communicating
with a client, some courts have held that the T.C. Theatre presumption applies when a client
demonstrates that an attorney had access to confidential information. See Consolidated Theatres,
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mgm't Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1954); General Elec. Co.
v. Valeron Corp., 428 F. Supp. 68, 72-74 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Empire Linotype School, Inc. v.
United States, 143 F. Supp. 627, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). Cf. NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d
128, 134 (2d Cir. 1976) (law firm disqualified because its attorneys had communicated with the
movant's former house counsel even though there was no proof that confidences had been
divulged). Moreover, if confidences were acquired as a result of an attorney-client relationship,
the fact that these "confidences" are a matter of'public record or are obtainable from sources
other than the client does not exculpate the attorney from representing an adverse interest. See
Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1973); Handelman v. Weiss,
368 F. Supp. 258, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (S.D.NY.
1971), aff'd sub noma. Hall v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972). Cf. NCK Org. v. Breg-
man, 542 F.2d at 133 (attorney does not avoid disqualification by proving that his new client
had the same knowledge of a former client's confidences as the attorney).
Although the T.C. Theatre presnlmption. has been uniformly adopted, some opinions have
expressed displeasure with its conclusive status, See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc.,
569 F.2d at 741 (Mansfield, J., concurring) (opining that it is unfair to exclude rebuttal that
relevant confidences were received); Citv of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec, Illuminating Co., 440
F. Supp. at 209 (concluding that equity demands that the presumption be rebuttable in view of
the trend toward specialization of attorneys).
20. If the mnovant fails to establish any one of these three elements, the court will not
proceed to the second level of inquiry and disqualification will not be granted. For example,
courts have refused to order disqualification where a prior attorney-client relationship was not
shown, See Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) (attorney
represented movant's co-defendant in a prior suit); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns,
Inc., 479 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. La. 1979) (attorney previously represented association of which
the movant was a member); Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Snpp. 1060, 1066 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(attorney represented party named as third-party defendant in a suit against movant; the third-
party defendant did not object to the attorney's representation of plaintiff). But see Handelman
v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. at 262-64 (attorney disqualified because of the appearance of impropri-
ety even though no prior attorney-client relationship existed).
If no substantial relationship exists between the prior representation and the current litiga-
tion, disqualification will not be granted. See Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 385
F.2d 992, 994-95 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968) (court refused to disqualify
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considering whether confidences reposed in one member of a firm have
been shared with other members. A presumption of shared confidences was
established by the Second Circuit in Laskey Bros. of West Virginia, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. ,21 and has been adopted by a majority of the
courts. 22 The more controversial issue of whether this presumption is re-
buttable has not been resolved. According to the Laskey decision, the pre-
sumption is irrebuttable so long as attorneys remain associated with one
another, but once an association is terminated, an attorney may rebut the
presumption that he or she shared confidences with a former colleague. 23  A
attorney whose prior representation of movant was unrelated to the pending trademark
infringement and unfair competition action); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., 440 F. Supp. at 209 (disqualification refused because attorney's status as bond counsel for
city was unrelated to antitrust suit city filed against attorney's client); Shelley v. The Maccabees,
184 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (disqualification refused because prior legal services
rendered in effecting a change in movant's organizational structure were unrelated to present
breach of contract suit). But cf. International Business Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271,
280 (3d Cir. 1978) (substantial relationship test held inapplicable when an attorney concurrently
represents conflicting interests); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 (2d
Cir. 1976) (same).
Even though a substantial relationship exists, disqualification may not be granted if a court
finds that the movant disclosed confidences to an attorney with no expectation that they would
be held inviolate. See Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977) (no expectation that
confidences of one party to a business combination will not be disclosed to the other party);
Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 479 F. Supp. at 469 (no expectation of
secrecy when movant disclosed confidences in conjunction with the defense of a trade associa-
tion of which movant was a member). Cf. City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co., 440 F. Supp. at 201-05 (movant was equitably estopped from seeking disqualification since
it actively sought the previous representation fully cognizant of the fact that the attorney rep-
resented a client with a potential adverse interest).
21. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956). The Laskey opinion
considered disqualification motions by defendant Warner Bros. in two separate suits, one
brought by Laskey Bros. and the other brought by Austin Theatres, Inc. Both suits involved
private antitrust actions in which the plaintiffs were represented by the law firm of Malkan &
Ellner. The disqualification motions were based on Malkan's former partnership with an attor-
ney, Isacson, who previously had represented Warner Bros. Id. at 825.
The court acknowledged that a presumption of shared confidences was an extension of the
Canons of Professional Ethics (the predecessor of the Code) but reasoned that such a presump-
tion was necessary "to facilitate maximum disclosure of relevant facts on the part of clients." Id.
at 827.
22. For cases supporting an initial presumption that client confidences are shared among
members of a law firm, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d at 1321;
Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d at 608 (dicta); Celanese Corp. v. Leesona Corp.,
530 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1976); Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (D. Conn. 1974);
Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. at 264. But see City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Il-
luminating Co., 440 F. Supp. at 211 (dicta) (argues for a presumption only among lawyers
practicing in the same area of concentration within a firm).
23. 224 F.2d at 827. In support of its holding, the court expressed concern that an irrebut-
table presumption "might seriously jeopardize [young lawyers'] careers by temporary affiliation
with large law firms." Id. The court also projected an adverse effect on clients, noting that
strictly applied disqualification rules might result in "difficulty in discovering technically trained
attorneys in specialized areas who were not disqualified, due to their peripheral or temporally
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dissenting judge in Laskey, however, argued that the presumption should be
irrebuttable regardless of whether it is applied to present or former as-
sociates.24  More recently, the Fifth Circuit implied that the presumption
should be irrebuttable by specifically extending liability for disqualification to
former partners of an attorney who participated in a client's representa-
tion.
2 5
Although courts consider whether a presumption of shared confidences is
rebuttable or irrebuttable as one factor in determining whether to disqualify
an attorney vicariously, they also seek guidance from case law interpreting
Canon 9. Unfortunately, the vague language of this Canon 2 6 is susceptible to
varying interpretations, and two divergent views have emerged. One view
espouses a broad, prophylactic application, 27 while the other suggests a more
remote connections with attorneys for the other side." Id. See generally Liebman, supra note 4,
at 1006 (criticizing the Laskey holding).
For decisions agreeing that the initial presumption of shared confidences is rebuttable, see
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975);
Baglini v. Pullman, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 1060, 1064 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 547 F.2d 1158
(3d Cir. 1976); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Conn. 1962),
aff'd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962); Fleischer v. A.A.P., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 552
(S.D.N.Y. 1958), appeal dismissed sub nora. Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
24. 224 F.2d at 833 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Recognizing that clients repose trust and confi-
dence in their attorneys, the dissent concluded that all members of a law firm assume an obliga-
tion not to breach the trust that any of the firm's clients has placed in any member of the firm.
Id. at 832. This obligation continues throughout an attorney's professional career regardless of
whether he or she subsequently terminates an association with the individual attorney in whom
the trust was originally reposed. Id. at 828. Moreover, the dissent concluded that the movant
would be faced with an insurmountable burden if he or she were required to prove that confi-
dences reposed in one member of a firm had been disclosed to other members. Id. at 833.
Accord, NCK Org. v. Bregmas, 542 F.2d at 134-35 (rejecting a requirement that a client prove
that his or her confidences have been shared for the same policy considerations that underlie
the irrebuttable presumption that a client reposes confidences in an attorney). See also Com-
mentary, The Disqualification Dilemma: DR 5-105(D) of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
56 NEB. L. REv. 692, 695 n.17 (1977) (noting that it would be nearly impossible to prove oral
disclosures of confidences).
25. American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971). In Ameri-
can Can, the court was asked to disqualify an attorney who acted as local counsel for the
plaintiff because a former partner of the attorney previously had represented the defendant. Id.
at 1126. The court imputed knowledge of his former partner to the attorney and disqualified
him. Rejecting a double imputation theory, the court refused to impute the local counsel's
presumed knowledge to independent co-counsel. The court noted that a new partner of an
attorney presumed to possess the knowledge of his former partners will not be disqualified
unless it is shown that the attorney to whom knowledge was imputed also possessed actual
knowledge. Id. at 1129. See also O'Toole, supra note 8, at 348 (suggesting that past or present
partners of a firm should not be allowed to represent an interest adverse to a former client of
the firm).
26. See note 6 supra.
27. See generally O'Toole, supra note 8 (containing an excellent discussion and analysis of
cases considering Canon 9 in the context of disqualification motions and concluding that a broad
application of the Canon is appropriate).
1082 [Vol. 29:1077
1980] NOVO 1083
restrictive approach. 28 Courts subscribing to the broad application hold that
their paramount responsibility is to preserve public confidence in the integ-
rity of the judicial system by ensuring that attorneys scrupulously adhere to
the highest standards of ethical conduct. 29  Under this view, the language of
Canon 9 is interpreted literally, and disqualification is ordered when an at-
torney's conduct might appear unethical to the layman even though the at-
torney has in fact acted ethically. 30 Doubt as to the ethical propriety of an
attorney's representation is resolved in favor of disqualification.
3 1
The more restrictive approach attempts to preserve public confidence in
the judicial system 3 2 without unnecessarily restricting either a client's right
to counsel of his or her choice 33 or an attorney's right to move from one
professional association to another without causing the disqualification of his
or her new colleagues. 34  Adopting this restrictive approach to Canon 9, the
Fifth Circuit devised a two-prong test under which disqualification will not
be ordered unless (1) it can reasonably be assumed that a specifically identi-
fiable impropriety occurred, and (2) the risk of arousing public suspicion
28. For a strong argument in support of a restrictive application of Canon 9 in attorney
disqualification cases, see Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-Silver
Chrysler Steers in a New Direction, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 130 (1975).
29. See Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); Empire Linotype School, Inc.
v. United States, 143 F. Supp. 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
30. See International Business Machs. Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d at 283; Kramer v. Scientific
Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1976); Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528
F.2d at 1387; Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 222 (N.D. I11. 1975), aff'd,
532 F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976).
31. For example, in Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973), the
court stated that disqualification is appropriate when there is "any possibility, however slight,
that confidential information acquired from a client during a previous relationship may sub-
sequently be used to the client's disadvantage." Id. at 571. Accord, Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 225 (7th Cir. 1978); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d at 571.
Note also, that the good faith of an attorney is irrelevant. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 606 F.2d
28, 34 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964); Doe v. A
Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Hall v. A. Corp., 453 F.2d
1375 (2d Cir. 1972).
32. Proponents of this approach argue that to preserve public confidence it is not necessary
to evaluate an attorney's conduct "by standards which can be imputed only to the most cynical
members of the public." Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 (5th Cir. 1976).
See also International Elecs. Corp. v. Flanzer, 527 F.2d 1288, 1295 (2d Cir. 1975) (cautioning
that Canon 9 "should not be used promiscuously as a convenient tool for disqualification when
the facts simply do not fit within the rubric of other specific ethical and disciplinary rules").
33. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d at 739; Fred Weber, Inc. v.
Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d at 609; Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d at 812. Cf. Laskey
Bros. of W. Va., Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 224 F.2d at 827 (noting that clients may
find it difficult to discover technically trained attorneys in specialized areas who would not be
subject to disqualification).
34. See Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 793 (Ct. C1. 1977); Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1975). See generally
Liebman, supra note 4 (an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the balancing of interests
in attorney disqualification cases). See also O'Toole, supra note 8, at 321-22 (suggesting five
conflicting interests commonly arising in motions to disqualify).
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exceeds the benefits accruing from the attorney's continued participation in
the litigation. 35
Against this background of conflicting case law, the Seventh Circuit was
asked to decide a vicarious disqualification motion in Novo Terapeutisk
Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. 36 Although only
three years earlier, in an almost identical case, 37 the same court had implied
an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences and adopted a broad,
prophylactic application of Canon 9,38 the court in Novo declined to follow
this precedent. 39
FACTS AND ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
In 1977, Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S filed a suit alleging that its
patent for a milk coagulating enzyme was being infringed by Baxter Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. 4 0  Baxter moved to disqualify Novo's attorneys, members
of the law firm of Hume, Clement, Brinks, Willian & Olds, Ltd., 41 because
in 1976 Baxter consulted with Granger Cook, Jr., then a member of the
Hume firm, 42 concerning a matter identified as "microbial rennet."' 43  Bax-
35. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d at 813. In Woods, the attorney whose
disqualification was sought represented former prisoners of war in a private action seeking re-
covery of investments made in an allegedly fraudulent securities scheme. The attorney previ-
ously had investigated the alleged fraud while on active duty as a reserve officer in the Navy's
Office of the Judge Advocate General. Id. at 807-09.
Undoubtedly, the court's limited application of Canon 9 was influenced by its perception that
motions to disqualify were often used for "purely strategic purposes." Id. at 813. The court felt
that the delays caused by such motions as well as the resulting disadvantage to a client whose
attorney is disqualified were susceptible of eliciting public suspicion of both the bar and the
judiciary. Id. The court concluded that it could not permit Canon 9 "to be manipulated for
strategic advantage on the account of an impropriety which exists only in the minds of imagina-
tive lawyers." Id. at 819. Similar concerns have been expressed by commentators. See O'Toole,
supra note 8, at 347-48; Van Graafeiland, Lawyer's Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View, 50
N.Y. ST. B.J. 101, 140-41 (1978).
36. 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979).
37. Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976) (defendant's attorney was
previously a member of a firm that prosecuted plaintiff's patent before the Patent Office).
38. See notes 76-81 and accompanying text infra.
39. See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra.
40. 607 F.2d at 195.
41. The action was originally filed in the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina. The Hume firm's involvement began when the suit was transferred to the
Northern District of Illinois. Id.
42. The Hume firm maintained a single office composed of about 25 attorneys. In addition
to Cook, six other members of the firm (then known as Hume, Clement, Brinks, Willian, Olds
& Cook, Ltd.) rendered services to Baxter including two members actively involved in the
current representation of Novo. See Defendants-Appellants' Answer to Petition for Rehearing
with Request that Rehearing be En Banc at 3, Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium A/S v. Baxter
Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 607 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979).
43. Brief for Appellant at 4. Previously, in 1971, the United States Patent Office declared an
interference (an inter-partes proceeding to determine priority between patent applicants claim-
ing substantially the same invention) between patent applications filed by Novo's and Baxter's
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ter alleged that the enzyme microbial rennet was substantially identical to
the one on which Novo's infringement action was based.44 Even though
Cook left the Hume firm in December 1976 taking the Baxter account with
him,4 5 Baxter contended that confidences it had reposed in Cook while he
was a member of the Hume firm should be imputed to the other members
and, consequently, require their disqualification. 46 The Hume firm opposed
the motion on the grounds that Cook's consultation concerning microbial
rennet was the only aspect of the firm's prior representation of Baxter that
related to Novo's infringement suit and no present member of the Hume
firm had been involved in that consultation.4 7  Moreover, each member of
the Hume firm filed an affidavit denying that he or she had received confi-
dences from either Baxter or Cook relating to the microbial rennet en-
zyme. 48
The district court denied Baxter's motion. 4 9  Noting that Cook's
timesheets recorded only two and one quarter hours of work relating to mi-
crobial rennet, 50 the court held that the Hume firm's prior representation of
Baxter was not substantially related to the present litigation and, accord-
ingly, disqualification of the firm was not warranted. 51
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit criticized the district court for resting its
decision solely on the basis of the amount of time Cook had spent on the
microbial rennet matter. Since a confidence can be revealed in a brief mo-
ment, the circuit court reasoned that the length of the prior representation
was irrelevant. 52 Rather, the proper test for determining if a substantial
relationship exists is whether there is a possibility that in a prior representa-
tion the attorney might have been given confidential information relevant to
the subject matter of the current litigation.53 The circuit court examined
predecessors in interest. The application of Novo's predecessor was deemed to have priority.
While the Hume firm did not take part in the interference proceeding, it was suggested that
the purpose of Baxter's consultation with Cook was to consider initiating a declaratory judgment
action against Novo regarding the patent. Id. at 2-5.
44. Id. at 24 app. (affidavit of Granger Cook, Jr. at 8).
45. Id. at 5. Cook also took most of the Baxter files. Id.
46. Id. at 14-15. Cook filed an affidavit outlining his prior representation of Baxter and
stating that during such representation he had received confidences from Baxter. Additionally,
Baxter's in-house Chief Patent Counsel filed an affidavit stating, on information and belief, that
confidences had been reposed in Cook and other members of the Hume firm. Neither of these
affidavits asserted specifically that confidences relating to microbial rennet had been disclosed
during the consultations. Id. at 22-30 app. (affidavits of Granger Cook, Jr. and Paul C. Flattery).
47. Brief and Supplemental Appendix for Plaintiff-Appellee at 13-15 [hereinafter cited as
Brief for Appellee].
48. Id. at Supp. app. 17-40.
49. 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
50. Brief for Appellee, supra note 47, at Supp. app. 15.
51. 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 495, 496 (N.D. I11. 1977).
52. 607 F.2d at 189.
53. Id. (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 588 F.2d 221, 224 (7th Cir.
1978)).
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Cook's prior representation under this definition of a substantial relation-
ship, 54 and concluded that Baxter's allegation of substantial identity between
microbial rennet and the enzyme accused of infringing Novo's patent suffi-
ciently established a possibility that Cook had been privy to confidences re-
lated to the pending litigation. 55
The court next considered the issues of whether Baxter had in fact re-
posed confidences in Cook and whether those confidences should be im-
puted to the other members of the Hume firm. The court followed estab-
lished precedent 5 6 and held that because a substantial relationship had been
shown, Baxter was irrebuttably presumed to have disclosed confidences to
Cook. 57  The court further held that it was unnecessary to decide whether
Cook's presumed knowledge was imputed to other members of the Hume
firm. Noting that the purpose of Canon 9 was to enjoin the appearance of
54. Reconsidering the substantial relationship issue, the circuit court undertook a three level
inquiry in accordance with its previous decision in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
588 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1978). The Westinghouse decision held that a court must: (1) reconstruct
the scope of the prior legal representation; (2) determine whether it is reasonable to assume that
the attorney was furnished with confidential information; and (3) determine whether such confi-
dential information is relevant to the facts in issue in the pending litigation. Id. at 225.
Novo advanced two arguments attacking the scope of Cook's prior representation of Baxter.
First, Novo argued that an affidavit submitted by Cook at the outset of the current litigation was
tantamount to an admission that Cook had not previously represented Baxter on matters in issue
in the Novo suit. Brief for Appellee, supra note 47, at 15-16. Alternatively, Novo contended
that the services Cook rendered on the microbial rennet matter did not qualify as "'legal rep-
resentation." Id. at 16-17. The court rejected both of these arguments.
The affidavit upon which Novo's first argument was based was filed by Cook in support of a
request for an extension of time to file pleadings and stated that he had not been able to study
the history of the patent, the relevant prior art, and the record of a prior interference pro-
ceeding. Id. at Supp. app. 1-2. The court declared that it would read no more into the affidavit
than appeared on its face. 607 F.2d at 190.
Novo's second argument relied on precedent established by the Second Circuit holding that
an attorney will not be considered to have represented a client when he or she is involved in a
matter "briefly on the periphery for a limited and specific purpose." Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 1975). This precedent applied,
according to Novo, because a portion of Cook's work on the microbial rennet matter included a
comparative study of legal authorities which could have been performed by a paralegal. Brief for
Appellee, supra note 47, at 16-17. The Novo court, however, interpreted the precedent to
apply only when an attorney's prior representation did not give rise to a fiduciary obligation,
and concluded that since the facts established that Cook was in a fiduciary relationship with
Baxter, Novo's reliance on the precedent was misplaced. 607 F.2d at 191.
In fact, Novo's second argument was faulty for two reasons. First, Cook's work on microbial
rennet included consultations with Baxter as well as research. See Brief for Appellee, supra note
47, at Supp. app. 15. Clearly, consulting with clients is considered "representation." Secondly,
courts have determined that the fact that services rendered by an attorney could have been
rendered by a non-lawyer is irrelevant. See, e.g., NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir.
1976) (for purposes of determining a substantial relationship, no distinction is made between
legal and non-legal work).
55. 607 F.2d at 191.
56. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
57. 607 F.2d at 191-92.
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impropriety, 58 the court reasoned that it was irrelevant whether or not the
Hume firm's attorneys representing Novo actually possessed knowledge of
Baxter's confidences. 59 Since Cook's prior consultation with Baxter on the
microbial rennet matter was so closely related to Novo's patent infringement
action, the court concluded that the Hume firm must be disqualified because
its representation of Novo created the appearance of impropriety. 60
On rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit reversed itself and denied
Baxter's motion. Unlike the previous panel opinion, the en banc decision
directly addressed the issue of imputed knowledge and adopted a rebuttable
presumption that confidences received by one member of a firm are imputed
to the other members. 61 In reaching its decision, the court reasoned that
the realities of law practice, as well as the ethical considerations underlying
Canon 9, supported a threshold presumption that members of a law firm
freely share their clients' confidences. 62 The court expressed concern, how-
ever, that rote reliance on an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences
could result in unwarranted disqualifications and concluded that the pre-
sumption need not be irrebuttable when, in cases like Novo, the attorney in
whom a client originally reposed confidences continued to represent that
client. 63  The court found sufficient evidence in the record rebutting the
presumption that Cook shared Baxter's confidences with other members of
the Hume firm and, accordingly, held that the firm's disqualification was not
required.64
CRITICISM AND IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The court's decision in Novo was clearly influenced by Cook's failure to
allege that he had disclosed Baxter's confidences to other members of the
Hume firm even though he was in the unique position to know whether or
not such a disclosure had in fact been made.6 5 Consequently, the Novo
court may have concluded that Baxter's disqualification motion was moti-
vated not by a genuine concern that the inviolability of its confidences was
58. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
59. 607 F.2d at 192.
60. Id. Chief Judge Fairchild dissented on the grounds that the majority opinion implied
that Canon 9 required an irrebuttable presumption of imputed knowledge. Judge Fairchild be-
lieved that at least under the facts presented in the Novo case, the presumption should be
rebuttable. Id. at 194 (Fairchild, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id. The opinion of the en banc hearing was written by the Chief Judge and largely
adopted the reasoning of his dissent from the previous panel decision.
62. Id. at 196-97.
63. Id. at 197.
64. Id. Three of the eight judges dissented on the grounds that they agreed with the views
expressed by the majority in the previous panel opinion. Additionally, one of the dissenters
wrote a terse separate opinion in which he warned that a rebuttable presumption of shared
confidences invites "casuistry and, even worse, a swearing contest." Id. at 197-98 (Swygert, J.,
dissenting).
65. Id. at 197. The court emphasized that Cook was "in a position to know exactly what
confidences he may have shared with others in his firm" and noted that "[hWis failure to allege,
even in general terms, that he shared confidences . . . [was] very significant." Id.
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in jeopardy, but rather by a desire to gain a tactical advantage by depriving
an opponent of its chosen counsel. 66 Certainly, the use of a disqualification
motion for purely tactical purposes cannot be condoned and the Seventh
Circuit cannot be criticized if the reason underlying its decision was to frus-
trate such an improper use. The court should be criticized, however, for
failing to limit the applicability of its rebuttable presumption to cases similar
to Novo in which the potential for abuse of the disqualification remedy is
apparent. Because the Novo holding is not so limited, the rebuttable pre-
sumption it creates can be applied indiscriminately to all disqualification
cases. Such a broad application finds no support in decisions reached by
other circuits6 7 and is at variance with an earlier Seventh Circuit opinion in
a case decided on facts strikingly similar to those in Novo. 68  Moreover, the
probable reaction of both the public and the legal profession to the newly
created rebuttable presumption may result in a decline in the quality of legal
representation.6 9
Although other courts have reached holdings similar to Novo, their decisions
have been based upon facts and policy considerations absent in Novo. For
example, the Second Circuit endorsed a rebuttable presumption in a case
seeking the disqualification of an attorney because, while he was an inex-
perienced member of a large law firm, he had been involved peripherally in
the representation of the movant. 70  That court concluded, under the facts
presented by the case, that an irrebuttable presumption of imputed knowl-
edge would unduly restrict the professional mobility of attorneys who begin
their careers at a large law firm, since they, as well as other members of a
firm they subsequently join, may be disqualified from appearing on behalf of
an interest adverse to any client of their former firm. 71  A similar policy
consideration induced the Fifth Circuit to apply Canon 9 less stringently in a
disqualification case directed at a former government attorney. 72 The court
refused to disqualify the attorney under Canon 9 merely because his
representation of a client in a matter related to work he performed while
employed by the government might create an appearance of impropriety. 73
The Fifth Circuit's decision was based upon its concern that the government
might be severely hampered in its ability to recruit competent attorneys if
66. In Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976), the court
openly expressed its view that disqualification motions are often brought for strategic purposes.
Id. at 813. See note 35 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 70-74 infra.
68. See notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra.
69. See text accompanying notes 85-90 infra.
70. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
71. See generally O'Toole, supra note 8, at 343 (criticizing the "young associate" exception);
Liebman, supra note 4, at 1012-14, 1013 n.65 (heralding the Silver Chrysler precedent and
suggesting that the judge's own former association with a large law firm may have influenced his
decision).
72. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976). See note 35 supra for a
synopsis of the facts of the Woods case.
73. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d at 819.
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prospective employees discerned that their practice would be restricted
upon leaving government service.
74
The Second Circuit and the Fifth Circuit precedents are not applicable to
Novo. The attorneys whose disqualification was sought in Novo were neither
former government attorneys nor inexperienced junior members of a firm
peripherally involved in a representation when they were alleged to have
acquired knowledge of Baxter's confidences. Moreover, the motion in Novo
was brought not because the attorneys whose disqualification was sought had
changed firm affiliation but rather because the client had changed firms. 75
Accordingly, the Novo court's refusal to order the Hume firm's disqualifica-
tion cannot be justified by the policy considerations underlying the Second
and Fifth Circuit decisions. Precluding a law firm as a whole from represent-
ing an interest adverse to one of its former clients will neither restrict the
professional mobility of the firm's individual members nor hinder the firm's
efforts to recruit new members.
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Novo is not only unsupported by the
reasoning underlying similar holdings of other courts but its holding also
conflicts with its own earlier opinion in Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana,
Inc. 76 In Schloetter, the court embraced the broad, prophylactic view of
Canon 9 which requires disqualification when there is an appearance of im-
propriety even though there is a possibility that no actual impropriety
exists. 77  Although it adopted a presumption that members of a law firm
share their clients' confidences, 78 the Schloetter court found it unnecessary
to decide whether this presumption was rebuttable. 79 Instead, the court
concluded that regardless of whether or not confidences actually had been
shared, an attorney's representation of an interest adverse to a party previ-
ously represented by a former member8" of the attorney's firm creates an
74. Id. at 812.
75. See text accompanying notes 45-46 supra.
76. 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976). In Schloetter, the plaintiff in a patent infringement suit
moved to disqualify the defendant's attorneys because they were members of the same firm as
another attorney who had previously assisted the plaintiff in acquiring the patent on which his
suit was based. Id. at 708. The court disqualified the defendant's attorneys even though the
attorney who previously represented the plaintiff was no longer a partner in the firm. Id. at
712-13.
77. See text accompanying notes 29-31 supra.
78. 546 F.2d at 711.
79. The court noted that "even if [it] were to agree that the inference of impropriety . . .
should be rebuttable," it would not disturb the lower court's finding that the evidence offered
in rebuttal was insufficient. Id.
80. The law firm in question was based in Ohio but the attorney who rendered services to
the plaintiff practiced in a Washington D.C. office formerly maintained by the firm. Id. at 708.
There was some question as to whether the Washington attorney was a present rather than a
former partner of the Ohio firm. The court, however, clearly stated that the attorney's actual
status as a present partner or a former partner was not germane to the issue of whether attor-
neys presently associated with the Ohio firm could ethically continue to represent the defend-
ant. Id. at 708 n.2.
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appearance of impropriety which requires the attorney's disqualification. 81 In
arriving at this decision, the Schloetter court emphasized that it would be
unreasonable to expect the public to believe that when they repose con-
fidences in one member of a law firm, the danger of those confidences sub-
sequently being used against them entirely dissipates upon that individual
member's departure from the firm.8 2  The Novo court, on the other hand,
chose to adopt the more restrictive view of Canon 9 under which relief will
not be granted when the appearance of impropriety is unsupported by evi-
dence of actual impropriety.8 3 Accordingly, the Novo court concluded that
although a former client is entitled to a threshold presumption that its confi-
dences were shared, evidence rebutting this presumption should not be
excluded.8 4
The Schloetter holding recognized that if clients are to derive the
maximum benefit from legal representation, it is crucial that they apprise
their attorneys of all relevant facts, including facts which may be detrimen-
tal.8 5 To overcome a natural reluctance to reveal potentially damaging in-
formation, a client must be given adequate assurance that he or she will
never be jeopardized by confidences reposed in an attorney.8 6 While the
Schloetter court's strict application of Canon 9 provides clients with such
assurance, the Novo court's creation of a rebuttable presumption of shared
confidences does not. A layman might not be easily convinced that the con-
fidences he or she divulged to one member of a firm are unknown to the
other members merely because an attorney has rebutted a presumption of
81. Id. at 711-12.
82. Id. at 711. Although in ordering disqualification the court relied heavily on public policy
considerations, it was convinced that disqualification was particularly appropriate in the Schloet-
ter case because, except for the departure of the attorney who had represented the plaintiff,
continuity in the membership of the firm had been maintained. The court believed that this
continuity increased the risk that the defendant's attorneys might be exposed to the plaintiff's
confidences. Id. In Novo, the Hume firm also maintained a continuity of membership sub-
sequent to Cook's departure. Apparently, the Novo court, unlike the Schloetter court, (lid not
believe this fact either increased the risk that a former client's confidences might be jeopardized
or created an appearance of impropriety.
83. See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
84. 607 F.2d at 197.
85. See CODE, supra note 1, at EC 4-1 ("A client must feel free to discuss whatever he
wishes with his lawyer .... A lawyer should be fully informed of all the facts . . . in order for
his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal system"). Accord, Fred Weber, Inc. v. Shell
Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1977); Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562,
570-71 (2d Cir. 1973); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193,
206 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).
86. See First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 571 F.2d 390, 396 (7th Cir. 1978)
(the policy encouraging full and frank discussion between an attorney and client requires that
the client have complete faith that his confidences will never be used against him); Emle In-
dus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d at 570-71 (without strict enforcement of ethical standards
a client will not be inclined to discuss his problems freely and in depth with his lawyer); Can-
non v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209, 221 (N.D. 111. 1975), aff'd, 532 F.2d
1118 (7th Cir. 1976) (the remedy of disqualification is designed to encourage individuals to
divulge freely to their attorneys all necessary information).
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shared confidences to the satisfaction of a court. 8 7  Consequently, the Novo
decision may cause clients erroneously to conclude that it is wise to withhold
potentially damaging information from their attorneys. 88
The Novo decision may also cause attorneys to withhold information from
their colleagues and, as a result, the quality of legal representation may de-
cline. The Novo precedent teaches attorneys that they can escape vicarious
disqualification by rebutting the presumption that they were privy to confi-
dences reposed in other members of their firm. Further, the Novo opinion
suggests that effective rebuttal can be achieved by submitting affidavits de-
nying the receipt of confidences. 8 9 Consequently, attorneys are given a
powerful incentive to isolate themselves from their colleagues so that sub-
sequently, if the need arises, they can honestly state under oath that they
did not share the confidences of their colleagues' clients. Clients, however,
often choose their legal counsel on the basis of the general reputation of the
law firm. They expect and are entitled to benefit from the collective experi-
ence and expertise of the firm's members. The quality of legal representation
will undoubtedly decline if attorneys deprive their clients of this benefit by
curtailing the free exchange of ideas and information."0
PROPOSED GUIDELINES
Case law has demonstrated that the language of Canon 9 is too broad to
furnish either courts or attorneys with adequate ethical guidelines. Recogniz-
ing a need for more specific standards, the American Bar Association's
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards included a section on
vicarious disqualification in its Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct. 9 1 Although the Commission's interpretive comments es-
87. See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1092 (3d Cir. 1976); Cinema 5,
Ltd. v. Cineraroa, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1387 n.1 (2d Cir. 1976); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown,
305 F. Supp. 371, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1969). See also O'Toole, supra note 8, at 345-46 (suggesting
that courts should consider a layman-oriented approach to Canon 9); Commentary, The Dis-
qualification Dilemma: DR 5-105(D) of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 56 NEB. L.
REv. 692, 702 (1977) (unsophisticated public might not recognize subtle distinctions that are
clear to a lawyer's eye).
88. See Note, Attorney's Conflict of Interest: Representation of Interest Adverse to that of
Former Client, 55 B.U. L. REV. 61, 64 (1975) (public display of a lawyer representing con-
flicting interests may prevent prospective clients from confiding in their lawyers).
89. 607 F.2d at 197. The only evidence offered in rebuttal of a presumption of shared
confidences were affidavits submitted by each member of the Hume firm denying the receipt of
confidences from Cook. The court held that these affidavits, uncontroverted by Cook, "clearly
and effectively" rebutted the presumption. Id.
90. See Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1325 (D. Conn. 1974) (noting that "attorney[s]
must feel entirely free to consult with [their] associates, to seek their professional advice, and to
share with them the facts of a case on which helpful advice can be given").
91. U.S.L.W., Special Supplement (Feb. 19, 1980) (draft available by writing the National
Center for Professional Responsibility, 77 South Wacker Drive, Sixth Floor, Chicago, Illinois
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tablish reasonable guidelines, 92 these comments do not appear to be com-
pletely harmonious with the formal statement of the rule. 93  Since the am-
biguity of the Commission's proposed rule may not promote uniform and
equitable decisions, the following guidelines with respect to vicarious
disqualification are suggested as an alternative: 94
60606). If adopted, the Model Rules will replace the CODE. See note 1 supra. The proposed
rule governing vicarious disqualification states, in pertinent part:
7.1 VICARIOUS DISQUALIFICATION
(b) When lawyers terminate an association in a firm, neither a lawyer remaining
in the firm nor one who has left it, nor any other lawyer with whom either
lawyer subsequently becomes associated, shall undertake representation that
involves:
(1) a significant risk of disclosing confidences of a client in violation of Rule
1,7, or making use of information to the disadvantage of a former client in
violation of Rule 1.10; or
(2) A lawyer's assuming significant participation in representing a person in
the same or a substantially related matter if the interest of that person is
adverse in any material respect to that of a client in whose representation
the lawyer had previously participated in a significant way.
U.S.L.W., Special Supplement 25 (Feb. 19, 1980).
92. The comments indicate that the Commission's intent is to treat a law firm as if it were a
sole practitioner when considering the firm's relationship with its current clients and to treat the
client of any individual member of the firm as a client of the firm as a whole. Accordingly, the
comments suggest that partners remaining in a firm would be precluded from representing an
interest adverse to a former client even if they were able to show that the former client was
represented solely by an attorney who was no longer a member of the firm and that the remain-
ing members had not shared the former client's confidences. Id.
The comments also address the issue of whether an attorney's association with a new firm will
require the new firm to be disqualified from representing interests adverse to clients of the
attorney's former firm. The comments suggest that an inquiry should be made to determine
whether the proposed representation by the attorney's new firm would involve a breach of
confidences or a breach of loyalty owed to a client of the attorney's former firm. Where no such
breaches would occur, disqualification of the new firm would not be required. Id.
93. For example, Rule 7.1 in paragraph (b)(1) states that "[a lawyer shall not make] use of
information to the disadvantage of a former client in violation of Rule 1. 10.'" See note 91 supra.
Rule 1.10 states, in pertinent part, that "a lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall
not thereafter [represent an interest adverse to the client]." U.S.L.W., Special Supplement 9
(Feb. 19, 1980). Comments interpreting Rule 7.1 suggest that the word "lawyer" in this Rule
should be read as "law firm," see note 92 supra, but that impression is not given by either Rule
7.1(b)(1) or Rule 1.10. Consequently, Rule 7.1(b)(1), read by itself, would appear to allow re-
maining members of a law firm to represent an interest adverse to a former client if the client
were previously represented by an attorney no longer associated with the firm. Similarly, para-
graph (b)(2) of Rule 7.1 precludes an attorney from participating in the representation of an
interest adverse to a former client "in whose representation the lawyer had previously par-
ticipated in a significant way." See note 91 supra (emphasis added). Again the language of this
Rule would appear to allow remaining members of a law firm to represent an interest adverse to
a former client of the firm while the comments suggest otherwise. See note 92 supra.
94. The guidelines proposed in this Note apply only to vicarious disqualification. Since case
law governing traditional disqualification is substantially in accord, these guidelines assume that
extant law will continue to be followed. See notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
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1. Client confidences received 95 by any member of a firm shall be ir-
rebuttably imputed to all persons who are partners in the firm at the
time the confidences are received.
2. An attorney to whom knowledge of a former client's confidences has
been imputed shall be disqualified from participating in the representa-
tion of a current client with interests adverse to the former client if the
representation of the current client encompasses matters substantially
related to the prior representation of the former client.
3. Present partners and associates of the attorney described in Rule 2
shall be disqualified only if, after an evidentiary hearing, 96 it is shown
that there is a substantial likelihood that the attorney described in Rule
2 possesses actual knowledge of confidences as well as imputed know-
ledge. 97  Facts to be considered include: 9s the size and organizational
structure 9 9 of the firm in which the attorney was associated when con-
fidences were imputed to him or her; the attorney's seniority and re-
For other commentators' suggestions on guidelines to be applied in both traditional and vi-
carious disqualification cases, see generally O'Toole, supra note 8, at 348-49; Van Graafeiland,
Lawyer's Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View, 50 N.Y. ST. B.J. 101, 141 (1978); Note, Attor-
ney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse to that of Former Client, 55 B.U.
L. REV. 61, 84 (1975); Note, Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing an Interest Adverse to
a Former Client, 57 TEX. L. REV. 726 (1979).
95. "Receipt" of confidences as used in the context of this rule assumes application of extant
case law. Accordingly, an attorney is irrebuttably presumed to have "received" confidences
under the T.C. Theatre test and modifications of the test holding that access to confidential
information is sufficient. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
96. Courts have previously considered in camera reviews to aid in resolving the threshold
question of whether the attorney possesses detrimental confidences. See Government of India v.
Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 741 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield, j., concurring) (suggesting that
an in camera review should replace the T.C. Theatre irrebuttable presumption that clients
repose confidences in their attorneys); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit
Mgm't Corp., 216 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1954) (dicta) (same).
97. See American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1129 (5th Cir. 1971) (suggest-
ing that a new partner of an attorney to whom knowledge had been imputed during a former
partnership would not be vicariously disqualified upon a showing that the partner with imputed
knowledge did not also have actual knowledge).
98. The client is not required to divulge to the court the actual confidences reposed in an
attorney. Rather, the evidentiary hearing proposed by this rule contemplates an objective
examination of facts relating to the environment in which knowledge was imputed to the attor-
ney. From these facts, the court should be able to make a reasonable inference as to the
likelihood that the attorney also possesses actual knowledge.
99. An attorney belonging to a large, departmentalized firm is less likely to have an oppor-
tunity to share confidences with his or her colleagues than an attorney in a small, non-depart-
mentalized practice. This is particularly true when the former client's representation was
primarily concentrated in a department of which the attorney was not a member. See City of
Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193, 211 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd,
573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) (suggesting imputation of
knowledge only to attorneys practicing in the same area of specialization); Liebman, supra note
4, at 1036-37 (suggesting that the size of a firm and the "lack of osmosis" among departments
should be considered as relevant evidence to rebut a presumption of imputed knowledge).
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sponsibilities 100 in the firm; and, the attorney's areas of expertise. 10 1
4. When disqualification is not required under Rule 3, a court may order
the firm to isolate 102 the attorney with imputed knowledge of a former
client's confidences from the firm's representation of a current client
with an adverse interest.
An irrebuttable presumption 103 of shared confidences is established in
Rule 1 for four reasons. First, an irrebuttable presumption is necessary if the
inviolability of a client's confidences is to be protected in accordance with
the mandate of Canon 4.104 Permitting attorneys to deny their receipt of a
client's confidences would abrogate the protection afforded by Canon 4 be-
cause the client would be forced to refute the attorney's denial by divulging
the very information he or she seeks to keep secret. 10 5  Second, the pre-
sumption will avoid the unseemly spectacle of attorneys engaging in "swear-
ing contests" in which one attorney alleges and another attorney denies the
sharing of a client's confidences. 10 6  Additionally, the elimination of "swear-
ing contests" relieves a court of the distasteful task of deciding which attor-
ney it chooses to believe. Third, the presumption will encourage partners of
a law firm to consult freely with one another regarding their clients' rep-
resentation since all partners will be assumed to be privy to the confidences
of each other's clients regardless of whether or not an exchange of informa-
tion occurs. Utilizing the collective knowledge and expertise of the firm's
partners will not only enhance the quality of the firm's representation of its
clients, but will also provide a convenient means for attorneys to benefit
100. An attorney with significant seniority and responsibility in a firm may become involved
in the supervision of many clients other than the ones he or she personally represents.
101. If the attorney specializes in an area of law that encompassed the prior representation of
the client, it would appear more likely that he or she may have been consulted and con-
sequently may have been privy to the client's confidences.
102. Screening techniques which isolate an attorney from the firm's representation of a client
have been approved in disqualification cases involving former government attorneys. See Cen-
tral Milk Producers Coop. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1978); Kesselhaut
v. United States, 555 F.2d 791 (Ct. Cl. 1977). See also ABA Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 343 (1975). Note, however, that in a disqualification case
not involving a former government attorney, the Seventh Circuit refused to approve screening
when separate offices of a multi-office law firm concurrently represented conflicting interests.
See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
103. See also O'Toole, supra note 8, at 348 (implying an irrebuttable presumption of imputed
knowledge by suggesting that past or present partners of a firm should not be allowed to repre-
sent an interest adverse to any former or current client of the firm).
104. See note I supra.
105. As the court eloquently stated in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953): "To compel the client to show . . . the actual confidential
matters previously entrusted to the attorney and their possible value to the present client would
tear aside the protective cloak drawn about the lawyer-client relationship." Id. at 269.
106. A dissenting judge in Novo noted his concern that a rebuttable presumption of shared
confidences would invite "swearing contests." See note 64 supra.
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from their colleagues' experience. 1 7 Finally, the adoption of an irrebut-
table presumption will promote certainty and uniformity in the law.
In recognition of a concern expressed by some courts that irrebuttable
presumptions may unduly hamper an attorney's mobility early in his or her
professional career,' 0 8 Rule 1 provides that the presumption is applicable
only to partners. 10 9 Moreover, to preclude an endless chain of imputation,
knowledge of confidences is imputed only to those firm members who are
partners at the time a colleague receives such confidences. Accordingly,
when an attorney joins a new firm, his or her new colleagues will not be
presumed to acquire the confidences of all clients represented by the attor-
ney's former firm.
Rules 2, 3, and 4 attempt to achieve an appropriate balance between the
interest of a former client in ensuring that his or her confidences are not
compromised and the interest of a current client in being represented by the
attorney of his or her choice. 110 Rule 2 recognizes that to maintain public
confidence in the legal system, ensuring the inviolability of a client's confi-
dences must take precedence. Accordingly, Rule 2 provides that an attorney
who might possibly possess knowledge of a client's confidences because of a
prior association with the client's attorney shall be automatically disqualified
from representing interests adverse to that client. Such automatic dis-
qualification is necessary because when an attorney is submerged in the
complexities of litigation, even his or her good faith effort to avoid using a
former client's confidences may not prevent the unconscious use of such
information. 111 Alternatively, out of an excess of good faith, an attorney
opposing a former associate's client may fail to make legitimate use of infor-
mation because of a concern that by doing so he or she would breach profes-
sional ethics" n 2
Rule 3 denies disqualification when a firm's representation of a client does
not jeopardize another party's confidences. The evidentiary hearing
suggested by the rule provides a court with sufficient facts from which to
107. One commentator suggested that establishing a presumption that partners have knowl-
edge of their firm's affairs may also evoke a greater sense of responsibility and ethical aware-
ness. See Liebman, supra note 4, at 1036-37 n.185.
108. See text accompanying notes 70-71 supra.
109. See also O'Toole, supra note 8, at.348 (author excludes non-partners who were not
personally involved in a prior representation of a former client from his suggested rule against
representing interests adverse to former or current clients).
110. Courts adopting a restrictive approach to Canon 9 have expressed their concern that an
appropriate balance among conflicting interests should be achieved. See notes 32-34 and accom-
panying text supra.
111. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973); T.C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. at 269. Automatic disqualification as well as
an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences also protects a former client from the attor-
ney who, acting in bad faith, consciously uses knowledge of a former client's confidences to that
client's disadvantage. Since such bad faith is difficult to detect or prove, an irrebuttable pre-
sumption and automatic disqualification may be the only feasible way to preclude an unethical
attorney from gaining a substantial and unfair advantage at the expense of a former client.
112. See Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d at 571.
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conclude whether attorneys representing one party to litigation might be
exposed to the confidences of the adverse party. If the hearing results in a
conclusion that a member of a firm possesses actual knowledge of the confi-
dences of a current client's opponent, then no member of the firm may
continue to represent the client. 1 13  Rule 4, providing for the isolation of an
attorney to whom the confidences of a current client's opponent have been
imputed, is designed to avoid even an appearance of impropriety and to
impress upon the public the view that the legal profession is observing the
highest standards of ethical conduct.
CONCLUSION
To maintain public confidence in the integrity of the legal system, courts
must ensure not only that an attorney's conduct is ethical but also that it
appears ethical. As one Second Circuit judge warned: "The semblance of
unethical behavior by practitioners may well be as damaging to the public
image as improper conduct itself." 114 In Novo, the Seventh Circuit did not
heed this warning. Departing from its earlier, well-reasoned decision in
Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc.,115 the Seventh Circuit refused to
acknowledge that a law firm's representation of a new client with an interest
adverse to its former client might create an appearance of impropriety in the
eyes of a layman. The court's failure to limit narrowly the scope of the re-
buttable presumption it created to cases in which the movant continues to
be represented by the attorney in whom it originally reposed confidences
may result in an overall decline in the effectiveness of legal representation.
Faced with a rebuttable presumption that attorneys share their clients' con-
fidences, clients may become wary of disclosing information to their attor-
neys, and attorneys may be discouraged from seeking the advice of their
colleagues.
The opposite holdings reached by the Seventh Circuit in Novo and
Schloetter clearly demonstrate that uniform results in vicarious disqualifica-
tion cases cannot be achieved by relying on the broad language of Canon
9.116 The profession is in need of specific guidelines. It is hoped that the
proposed guidelines discussed in this Note will reach a reasonable balance
among the competing interests of attorneys and clients and, at the same
time, will instill confidence in the integrity of the judicial system.
Terry Ann Ross
113. Present partners or associates of an attorney possessing actual knowledge of a party with
an interest adverse to a current client of the firm would be disqualified under extant law. See
note 5 supra.
114. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 759 (2d Cir.
1975) (Adams, J., concurring). Accord, Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1088
(3d Cir. 1976) ("the appearance of conduct associated with institutions of the law [is] as impor-
tant as the conduct itself").
115. 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
116. See O'Toole, supra note 8, at 350 (suggesting that Canon 9 may be too vague for consis-
tent application).
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